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Abstract 
Managerial capital has received attention in recent years as one of the major 
determinants for enterprise productivity, growth, and longevity.  While recent 
empirical studies make it clear that training intervention can improve the management 
level, it remains unclear why the managers had not made efforts to obtain these basic 
knowledge.  To test the hypothesis that the reason lies in low valuation for obtaining 
knowledge, we conduct experimental training programs for the managers of SMEs in a 
knitwear cluster in rural town in Vietnam.  We find that the demand for these trainings 
was indeed low prior to trainings, but increased greatly with own learning experience, 
and that those with a higher prior demand tended to benefit more from the training.  
We also examine the spill-over effects from their peers and find their heterogeneous 
impacts across the types of trainings conducted. 
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1. Introduction 
Managerial capital, or the ability to manage a business, has received attention in recent 
years as one of the major determinants of enterprise productivity, growth, and longevity 
(Bruhn et al., 2010; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2012).  Several studies have assessed the 
impacts of managerial training intervention on business performance, finding positive 
results (e.g., Bloom et al., 2011; Karlan and Valvida, 2011; Mano et al., 2012).  These 
studies make it clear that many enterprises in developing countries are indeed poorly 
managed.  Moreover, the empirical results of these studies indicate that even 
short-term basic business training can improve their management practices. 
It remains unclear why this has been the case, however.  These experimental 
training programs teach only very standard or basic business practices (such as the 
importance of keeping business records, advertising, and saving costs), which managers 
could easily learn from sources other than these programs if they wish to.  Although 
most of these training programs studied are offered for free, the average take-up rate for 
the offer of training programs surveyed was only about 65 percent (McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2012).  The following have been identified as potential constraints, (a) they 
may simply be unaware of the value of training (information failure), (b) they may face 
credit constraints, (c) there may be supply-side constraints, and/or (d) they may have 
little incentive to invest in training in light of positive spillovers to non-investors 
(McKenzie and Woodruff, 2012).   
One of the purposes of this paper is to examine the extent to which the value of 
learning about management practices is unknown to business people in developing 
countries.  We collected data from the managers of small and medium enterprises 
producing knitwear in a suburb of Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, before and after basic 
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business training was provided for more than 100 managers in our sample.  This was a 
research project funded by the World Bank.  We designed the training programs 
together with local and international business consultants, who also served as instructors, 
and conducted the baseline and follow-up surveys.  The project had two training 
programs of different modes: a classroom training program in which trainees study in a 
classroom and an on-site training program in which instructors visit trainees’ 
workshops.  
The second purpose of our study is to examine which type of training is more 
effective.  While the results of several business training experiments have been 
reported in the recent literature, most of them assess the impacts of only one type of 
training (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2012).  However, in the world of development 
assistance practice, various types of training are also commonly conducted, such as 
hands-on consultation, peer-group discussion, and plant visits.  Moreover, there can be 
a variety of ways in which the same subject is taught and a variety of combinations of 
different subjects in a training program.  The preceding studies have paid little 
attention to the issues of what should be taught and how, with a major exception of 
Drexler et al. (2010).  The current paper is a small step in this direction of research on 
the role that management training can play in industrial development assistance. 
Our study site is a cluster of small and medium-sized knitwear enterprises 
previously studied by Vu et al. (2010).  Most studies of management training look at 
the impacts of a training program on microfinance clients who operate in various 
business sectors.  One concern for targeting the microfinance users is that the take-up 
rate may have been artificially biased upward as the participation into training is 
obligatory or recommended.  Another concern is that the microfinance users tend to be 
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very small in size, typically employing only a few workers (McKenzie and Woodruff, 
2012), while in reality, many SMEs in developing countries are of larger sizes, 
employing dozens of workers.  Our sample enterprises are much larger in terms of 
employment than those of other studies, and this setting may offer a more realistic view 
of the potential of SMEs in developing countries. 
Our contributions are as follows.  Firstly, we find that the demand for these 
training programs by entrepreneurs was indeed low before the offer of training, possibly 
being a barrier to improve management, but it increased greatly with the participation 
experience of the relevant training programs.  This suggests that these entrepreneurs’ 
ex-ante demand was low because they had not known the significance of attending these 
training sessions.  Participation in one kind of training also increased the demand for 
another type of training offered in future.  Secondly, we confirmed that managerial 
capital is indeed transferrable via technical interventions, as shown in other existing 
studies.  The training program had impacts on improving the business practices as well 
as business performance of participating enterprises.  The on-site hands-on training 
customized to each workshop (hereinafter called onsite training) had a greater effect in 
improving business practices than the classroom lecture-type of training (hereinafter 
called classroom training), and there was also a synergy effect from participating in both 
types of trainings.  Thirdly, the higher quantiles in the business practice score 
distribution were found to benefit more from the training.  Lastly, we find that the 
willingness to learn prior to training has positive effects in enhancing the training 
impact on the business practice, particularly when it is combined with the own learning 
through classroom training participation. 
In the next section, we illustrate our experimental setting and the data collected by 
4 
 
our surveys.  Section 3 presents the estimation methods, and section 4 explains the 
estimation results.  The conclusion follows in section 5. 
 
2. Experimental Setting and Data 
We implemented two types of training for the managers of the small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the knitwear industrial cluster in La Phu commune in Northern Vietnam, 
where many village-based industrial clusters are found (e.g., Vu et al., 2009, 2010).  
This cluster is located about 20 km from Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam.  It has a long 
history of garment production, dating back before 1945 (Vu et al., 2010).  Earlier many 
villagers from this cluster worked in French garment factories in Hanoi.  In the 1960s, 
two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were established near the village, producing towels 
and socks for export to the Soviet Union.  In the 1970s, two cooperatives were 
established within the village, receiving subcontracting orders from these SOEs.  
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the SOEs stopped contracting out to these 
cooperatives, bringing closure to these cooperatives.  The knitting machines used in 
the cooperatives were given to the member households, and this led to the expansion of 
household enterprises in this village.  While these household enterprises sold to 
domestic market through petty traders in the beginning, many of them started exporting 
to Russia and Eastern Europe through the Vietkieu, overseas Vietnamese traders, who 
are originally from this village. 
As of 2010, there were 161 enterprises that produce finished products, and most 
of them were engaged in knitwear clothing, such as sweaters, pants, and gloves.
1
  
                                            
1
 As there was no official list of these enterprises, we surveyed the leaders of all the 
residential blocks of the village to obtain the total number of enterprises. 
5 
 
Within this village and nearby villages, there are numerous household enterprises 
specializing in fabricating and knitting parts of clothes, such as sleeves or collars, which 
sell to these finished-product enterprises, comprising a large knitting industry cluster.  
The majority of the proprietors of the finished-product companies used to be employed 
by the cooperatives or the SOEs and have the experience of working as household 
subcontractors before they established their companies (Vu et al., 2010).  According to 
our data, about 22.5% of the enterprises export, while the others target the domestic 
market.  Contracting-out and subcontracting-in some parts of the work is very common 
within the cluster.  In 2011, 97.5% of the enterprises in La Phu contracted-out their 
work, while 27.5% subcontracted-in their work, because the majority of the 
subcontractors are located in the neighboring villages. 
In the summer of 2010, we started a series of interventions to the enterprises in 
the cluster.  Figure 1 describes the timeline of our activities.  We conducted 
interviews with all of the 161 proprietors of the finished-product enterprises based on a 
questionnaire.  Out of the 161, two enterprises were dropped from the sample because 
they were selected as “model enterprises” in the onsite training and received 
exceptionally-intensive treatment by the consultant team.  The other 159 enterprises 
were interviewed in the baseline survey conducted before the classroom training, the 
first follow-up survey between the two training programs, and the second follow-up 
survey after the onsite training.  All but one in the baseline survey sample answered 
our questionnaires in both the first and second follow-up survey, and the reason for this 
one enterprise’s attrition was business closure.  The survey included questions on the 
socio-economic characteristics of the owner and enterprise, business practices 
conducted, workers hired, finance, business performance, and the owners’ willingness to 
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pay to participate in the training programs.  
Data on willingness-to-pay for the classroom training and the onsite training 
program were collected by using the dichotomous question separately for each program: 
“Would you pay 3 million VND (about 155USD as of 2010) to participate in the 
training program?”2  This is a hypothetical question, which is unaccompanied by any 
actual payment for a training fee and does not penalize respondents who give an 
affirmative answer without careful consideration.
3
  Thus, this question can lead to an 
exaggeration of the demand for training participation.  In order to find a way to avoid 
such a bias in replies to hypothetical questions in general, Blumenschein et al. (2008) 
conducted laboratory experiments and found that the bias can be reduced to a negligible 
magnitude by means of what they call the “certainty approach.”  We employed this 
approach, which is the same in our context as asking, if the answer to the above 
willingness-to-pay question was positive, an additional question, “How sure are you 
about the answer?” with dichotomous options, “definitely sure,” or “probably sure,” and 
only count “definitely sure” as the affirmative answer.  Although it would be desirable 
to obtain information on the shape of the demand curve, it is unknown whether the 
certainty approach can be used in sequence to elicit the willingness of the same 
respondent to pay different prices, without affecting the respondent’s valuation.  We 
confined ourselves to only one level of training fee.
4
 
                                            
2
 The amount $155 was determined based on local information.  Once the teaching 
materials are prepared and the training contents are standardized, it is not impossible to 
reduce the cost of the training program per participant to this level in future. 
3
 The willingness-to-pay question is hypothetical also in that when the question was 
asked of the training participants during the follow-up surveys, we asked whether they 
would pay 3 million VND to participate the training program if they had not received 
the training.  
4
 This is what the authors of Blumenschein et al. (2008) recommended us to do in our 
7 
 
Another unique feature of our survey is the set of very detailed business practice 
questions related to business records, quality improvement, marketing strategy, and 
KAIZEN housekeeping practices, which will be explained below (see also Appendix).  
Whenever possible, our enumerators tried to verify the respondent’s answers by 
inspecting the housekeeping arrangements in the workshop carefully and asking 
additional questions.  This worked well in the case of such questions as “Do you keep 
raw materials and scraps separately?” It did not work if, for example, the respondent did 
not keep any records and when the question was “Do you separate household and 
business expenses?” Using the results of these structured interviews and observations, 
we constructed a business score index, which will be used to measure the performance 
of the enterprises.  While we do not claim that this index is a perfect proxy of the 
quality of management, we believe it serves the purpose.  Similar methods have been 
used in other studies (e.g., Bloom et al., 2011; de Mel et al., 2012). 
After the baseline survey, we conducted the classroom lecture series, which lasted 
three weeks and was offered for two and a half hours in the evening to accommodate as 
many participants as possible.  The topics were 1) Entrepreneurship, Business Strategy, 
and Marketing, 2) Production Management (including KAIZEN which is later 
explained), and 3) Accounting and Costing.  The training was offered in a local 
language in a participatory manner, and participants were able to engage in the active 
discussions following the lectures. 
Our second intervention was the tailor-made onsite consulting services offered at 
the workshop of each enterprise.  The main purpose of the onsite training was to 
facilitate a better understanding on basic production management by giving specific 
                                                                                                                                
personal communication with them. 
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advice to managers at their actual work space.  Prior to the onsite training, two 
enterprises were selected to act as model enterprises, and the team of consultants 
designed improvement plans for the model enterprises, including such changes as 
labeling the tools and materials and changing the layout of the workshop, and actually 
applied the plans to the model enterprises.  At the beginning of the onsite training, a 
seminar was held to explain the overall goal of the onsite training to the participants, 
and photographs of these model workshops before and after the application of the plans 
were also displayed.  These model enterprises were also open to the participants 
afterwards for observation.  The criteria for the selection of the model enterprises was 
that the model enterprises must be willing to share knowledge and experience with other 
participants and accept visitors to their workshops.  Thus, the proprietors of the 
selected enterprises were more eager to learn about management and have larger 
workshops than average.  The exclusion of these two enterprises from the sample 
would more likely lead to the underestimation of the impact of the training rather than 
overestimation.  Each onsite training participant received visits from the consultant 
team twice.  The first visit was to give advice based on the diagnosis of the current 
situation, and the second visit was to check on the progress and conduct follow-up.
5
 
Both the classroom and onsite training were conducted by a team of local 
consultants and a Japanese consultant.  The local consultant leader is a certified 
business consultant who is a Master Trainer of the International Labour Organization’s 
Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) program, which has been implemented 
worldwide.  The main purpose of including a Japanese consultant was to transfer the 
knowledge of KAIZEN methods, a commonsense, inexpensive approach to 
                                            
5
 For the details of the training, refer to Sonobe, Suzuki, and Otsuka (2010). 
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management, which was developed on the basis of industrial engineering by 
incorporating the experiences and insights of Japanese manufacturing enterprises and is 
now commonly practiced in developed countries and emerging economies.  The 
dispatched consultants were experts on KAIZEN and had considerable experience in 
KAIZEN training in Southeast Asia as well as in Japan.  The local consultants were 
also able to learn from them for future use. 
To conduct the experimental training, among the total 158 sample enterprises, we 
randomly selected 89 enterprises to invite to the classroom training program and 48 
enterprises to invite to the onsite training programs, as shown in Table 1.  We refer to 
invitation as treatment in this table, so that the treatment group of the classroom training 
program consists of enterprises invited to this program, while the enterprises not invited 
to this program constitute the control group.  There were 32 enterprises invited to both 
programs (Group 1) and 53 enterprises invited to neither program (Group 4).  We 
deliberately invited more than half of the sample enterprises to the classroom training 
program taking account of the possibility of refusal to attend the training.  Indeed 37 
invited enterprises did not participate in the classroom training.  By contrast, all the 
enterprises invited to the onsite training program participated in that program.   
Table 2 presents the characteristics and business performances of each group 
observed during the baseline survey.  The first two columns compare the treatment and 
control groups of the classroom training, and the p-values in column (3) indicate the 
statistical significance of the difference between the two groups.  Columns (4) to (6) 
compare Group 1 and Group 2, while columns (7) to (9) compare Group 3 and Group 4.  
From these figures, we can see that the owners tend to be around forty years old, and 
about sixty percent of the owners are females, reflecting the fact that this is the fashion 
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industry.  Owners tend to have seven to eight years of education and have operated for 
about ten years.  On average, they hired about 14.3 workers (permanent-worker 
equivalent) at the time of the baseline survey.
6
  This is worth emphasizing because 
most other studies of management training experiments focus on self-employed 
business persons or microenterprises with much smaller employment sizes.   
Another important point is that despite the randomization, there are some 
statistically significant differences among the groups.  This is because the sample size 
is small and because we divide the small sample into four groups, not just two.  For 
example, while the treatment and control groups of the classroom training program do 
not differ significantly in the willingness-to-pay, significant differences emerge if we 
divide the sample into four groups.  We will pay due consideration to this point when 
we assess the impacts of the training programs in the next two sections. 
 
3. Estimation Methods 
This paper presents the estimates of the intention-to-treat effects (ITT) and the treatment 
effect on the treated (TOT).  The ITT estimates will show whether being invited to the 
training programs will enhance the outcomes, that is, willingness to pay, business 
practice score, and business performance, of those invited enterprises, while the TOT 
estimates will show the extent to which participating in the training programs will 
enhance the outcomes of the participants.  The estimate of the ITT can be obtained by 
running the following regression:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼1𝐼𝑖
𝐵 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑖
𝐶 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑖
𝑂 + 𝑋𝑖𝜑 + 𝜀𝑖,        (1) 
                                            
6
 One seasonal worker is considered as one-third of a permanent worker based on the 
average number of months worked in a year by each type of worker.  
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where yi is the outcome variable (i.e., either willingness-to-pay, business practice scores, 
or business performance) for enterprise i after the onsite training program, 
j
iI is the 
invitation status dummy which is equal to 1 if enterprise i was invited to the training 
program j (= both, classroom, onsite) and 0 otherwise, and Xi is a vector of variables 
representing the socio-economic characteristics of the business owner, which happened 
to be time-invariant in our sample, ’s are coefficients and  is a vector of coefficients, 
and i is an error term.  If enterprise i was invited to the classroom training program 
only, then 𝐼𝑖
𝐶 = 1 and 𝐼𝑖
𝑂 = 𝐼𝑖
𝐵 = 0.  Likewise, if enterprise i was invited to the 
onsite training program only, then 𝐼𝑖
𝑂 = 1 and 𝐼𝑖
𝐶 = 𝐼𝑖
𝐵 = 0 .  If enterprise i was 
invited to both programs, the three invitation status dummies are equal to 1.  Thus, 
𝐼𝑖
𝐵is the product of 𝐼𝑖
𝐶and 𝐼𝑖
𝑂, and the impact of being invited to both programs is equal 
to 1 + 2 + 3.   
     The fixed-effect model corresponding to equation (1) may be written,  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑖
𝐵𝑇𝑡
𝑂 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝑂 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑖
𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝑂 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡,           (2) 
where yit is the outcome of enterprise i at time t, which is before the classroom training 
program (i.e., at the time of the baseline survey) or after the onsite training program (i.e., 
at the time of the second follow-up survey), 𝑇𝑡
𝑂 is a time dummy that equals 1 if t is 
the time after the onsite training program (i.e., the time of the second follow-up survey) 
and 0 if t is before the onsite training program (i.e., the time of the baseline survey), t 
is the time effect common to all the enterprises, ui is the fixed effect of enterprise i, and 
wit is an error term.  The effects of the time-invariant characteristics Xi in equation (1) 
are superseded by the fixed effect ui in equation (2). 
Coefficients ’s in equation (2) capture the changes in the treatment group’s 
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outcome from the time of the baseline survey to the time of the second follow-up survey 
relative to the control group’s counterpart.  Coefficients ’s in equation (1) capture the 
difference in the level between the groups at the time of the second follow-up survey, 
which amounts to the difference in the initial level plus the difference in the changes.  
If randomization were perfect, there would be no difference in the initial level and, 
hence, the estimates of ’s would be close to the estimates of’s, even though the 
estimation of equation (1) uses only the second follow-up survey data while the 
estimation of equation (2) uses both the baseline data and the second follow-up survey 
data.  As we have seen from Table 2, however, it happened to be that, at the time of the 
baseline survey, those enterprises which were invited only to the onsite training program 
(i.e., Group 3) were already more willing to pay for the classroom training than those 
who were invited to neither program (i.e., Group 4).  Thus, the estimate of 3 is 
expected to be greater than the estimate of 3 in the regressions of the willingness to pay 
for the classroom training.  
Another version of the fixed-effects model may be written 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝐼𝑖
𝐵𝑇𝑡
𝐶 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑖
𝐵𝑇𝑡
𝑂 + 𝛾3𝐼𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝐶 + 𝛾4𝐼𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝑂 + 𝛾5𝐼𝑖
𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝐶 + 𝛾6𝐼𝑖
𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝑂 
                         +𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,         (3) 
where subscript t indicates the time of either the baseline survey, the first follow-up 
survey, or the second follow-up survey, 𝑇𝑡
𝐶 is a time dummy equal to 1 if t is the time 
after the classroom training program (i.e., the time of the first or the second follow-up 
survey).  The estimation of this fixed-effects model is expected to reveal the timing of 
when each group felt the impacts of the interventions.  For example, suppose that 
Group 2 increases their willingness-to-pay for the classroom training after the classroom 
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training program relative to the control group and further increases it after the onsite 
training program.  In this case, both 3 and 4 will be positive, and the combined effect 
3 + 4 should be equal to the training effect on the willingness-to-pay measured after 
the onsite training, i.e., 2 in equation (2).  Likewise, 1 + 2 should be equal to 1, and 
5 + 6 should be equal to 3.
7
 
     We turn now to our method for estimating the TOT.  The equations to be 
estimated are similar to equations (1) to (3), but they feature the participation status 
dummies P’s instead of the invitation status dummies I’s.  As we saw in Table 1, a 
number of the enterprises that were invited to the classroom training program did not 
participate in it.  Hence, 𝑃𝑖
𝐶  is not equal to 𝐼𝑖
𝐶, and it is not exogenous like 𝐼𝑖
𝐶 but 
self-selected.  Likewise the interaction terms 𝑃𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝐶 and 𝑃𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝑂, the counterparts of  
𝐼𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝐶 and 𝐼𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝑡
𝑂 in equation (2) or (3), are endogenous.  By contrast, 𝑃𝑖
𝑂 is equal to 
𝐼𝑖
𝑂for all i because in the case of the onsite training, every sample enterprise complied 
with the random assignment to the treatment or control group.  It should be clear, 
however, that 𝑃𝑖
𝐵 , the dummy indicating whether enterprise i participated in both 
programs, is endogenous, and so are the interaction terms that include 𝑃𝑖
𝐵 .  To 
mitigate the estimation-bias problem arising from the self-selection into participation in 
the classroom training program, we apply the instrumental variable method to the 
endogeneity of 𝑃𝑖
𝐶 , 𝑃𝑖
𝐵, and the interaction terms of these dummies and time dummies. 
Our instrumental variables are 𝐼𝑖
𝐶, 𝐼𝑖
𝐵, and the corresponding interaction terms, which 
should be valid instrumental variables because they are closely associated with the 
corresponding endogenous variables but exogenous to the outcomes. 
                                            
7
 If our data are of unbalanced panel, however, these equalities do not hold true. 
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     We use equations (1) to (3) and their IV counterparts to estimate the ITT and TOT 
on the willingness-to-pay, the business practice score, and business performance.  In 
addition, we estimate the quantile treatment effect on the business practice score, that is, 
the impacts of the training on the distribution of the business practice score, not just its 
means.  Examining the difference of training impact across the distribution may 
provide additional information useful for designing a more effective training program.  
Suppose, for example, that the training increases the business practice scores of only 
those participants whose baseline scores were relatively high.  It is advisable to revise 
the training contents so that they can be understood and adopted by a greater number of 
participants.  Conversely, if the training is found to benefit only the participants with 
relatively low initial scores, it suggests the need for providing a more advanced course 
for those with relatively high initial scores.  
We estimate the quantile treatment effects of the classroom and onsite training 
programs. For the classroom training program, we employ the unconditional 
endogenous quantile regression estimator developed by Frölich and Melly (2010).   
For the onsite training program, however, we employ the unconditional exogenous 
quantile regression estimator developed by Firpo (2007) because all the invited 
enterprises participated in the onsite training but not in the classroom training.  Frölich 
and Melly (2010) show that unlike the mean treatment effect, estimated quantile 
treatment effects are asymptotically affected by the inclusion of covariates even when 
the covariates are independent from the treatment status.  In their method, the 
covariates are excluded from the final regression equation but included in the first stage 
15 
 
regression.
8
   
 
4. Estimation Results 
Since the take-up rate for the invitation to classroom training was low (Table 1), we 
begin by examining who actually participated in the classroom training.  The estimates 
of the probit models are shown in Table 3.  Three explanatory variables, i.e., the age, 
sex, and initial business practice score of the business owner, are statistically significant, 
indicating that among the invited entrepreneurs, those who accepted the invitation 
tended to be young males and have relatively high initial business practice scores.  As 
shown in Table 1, the take-up rate for onsite training improved dramatically to 100% 
compared to the take-up rate for classroom training.  This increase might have 
occurred because the entrepreneurs perceived lower opportunity costs of or greater 
benefit from participating in the onsite training than participating in the classroom 
training, or because they came to value managerial training in general more than before 
the classroom training program. 
Table 4 presents the estimated ITT of the classroom and onsite training programs 
on the willingness-to-pay for each training program.  Columns (i) to (iii) show the 
estimated impacts on the willingness-to-pay for the classroom training, while columns 
(iv) to (vi) show those for the onsite training.  Columns (i) and (iv) report the OLS 
estimates of equation (1) discussed in the previous section, while columns (ii) and (v) 
report the estimated fixed-effects model in equation (2).  Columns (iii) and (vi) are 
intended to examine when the willingness-to-pay increases and correspond to the 
                                            
8
 The conditional endogenous quantile effects estimation was developed by Abadie, 
Angrist, and Imbens (2002).  We used the conditional endogenous quantile effects 
estimator as well and found that the results are qualitatively the same as Figure 2. 
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fixed-effects model in equation (3).   
In column (i), the coefficients on the Class Invite dummy and the Onsite Invite 
dummy are positive and highly significant, which indicates that at the time of the 
second follow-up survey, the treatment group of the classroom training program (i.e., 
Groups 1 and Group 2) was more willing to pay for the classroom training than those 
business owners who were not invited to either program (i.e., Group 4).  These results 
are consistent with our expectation.  We find it inconsistent, however, that the 
coefficient on the Onsite Invite dummy is greater than that on the Class Invite dummy 
because this result indicates that while Group 3 was not invited to the classroom 
training program, it was as willing to pay for the classroom training as Group 2.  A 
possible interpretation is that this result comes from the fact that Group 3 happened to 
include those business owners who were willing to pay for the classroom training from 
the beginning, as we saw in Table 2.  Indeed, column (ii) indicates that the 
willingness-to-pay of Group 3 did not increase significantly relative to Group 4.  
Unlike column (i), column (ii) also suggests that even in Group 4, some owners 
increased their willingness-to-pay as the insignificant but positive coefficient on the 
time dummy Tclass indicates.  It is Group 1, and to a lesser extent Group 2 as well, that 
increased the willingness-to-pay for the classroom training significantly relative to 
Group 4.  Column (iii) indicates that these increases in the willingness-to-pay of these 
two groups (i.e., the treatment group of the classroom training program) were observed 
immediately after the classroom training program, and that they became moderate by 
the time of the second follow-up survey. 
In column (iv), the coefficients on the Both Invite dummy and the Onsite Invite 
dummy are positive and highly significant, which indicates that the treatment group of 
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the onsite training program had significantly high willingness-to-pay for the onsite 
training relative to Group 4.  The coefficient on the Onsite Invite dummy in column 
(iv) is greater than the coefficient on the interaction term Onsite Invite × Toniste in 
column (v).  Presumably this is because Group 3 happened to be more willing to pay 
for the onsite training than the other groups from the beginning, as shown in Table 2. In 
column (vi), the estimates of the coefficients indicate that the willingness-to-pay of 
Groups 1 and 3 for the onsite training increased after the onsite training program. 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the TOT impacts of the two training programs on 
the willingness-to-pay for each program.  The explanatory variables related to the 
classroom training program, Both Participate, Class Participate, and their interaction 
terms are endogenous because of self-selection into participation in that program.  
They are instrumented with the time dummies, Tclass and Tonsite are instrumented with the 
corresponding invitation status dummies and interaction terms.  The coefficients on 
these instrumented endogenous variables in the first three columns in this table are 
greater in magnitude and more highly significant than the corresponding coefficients in 
Table 4.  This is because the latter were diluted by the 37 non-participants who were 
invited to the classroom training program, who increased little their willingness-to-pay 
for the classroom training.  The magnitudes of the coefficients on Onsite Participate 
and its interactions with the time dummies are the same as in Table 4, even though they 
differ slightly in the significance level.   
     Overall, the results shown in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the participants in the 
classroom training program increased their willingness-to-pay for the classroom training 
significantly compared with those who were not invited to this program.  This lends 
strong support to our hypotheses that small business owners are unaware of the value of 
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learning about basic management practices, and that participation in even a short-term 
classroom training course like ours can help them appreciate the value of improving 
managerial skills.  Although the increase in the willingness-to-pay of Group 3 for the 
onsite training is marginally insignificant in Table 5, it is marginally significant in Table 
4, and Group 1 increased the willingness-to-pay for the onsite training highly 
significantly after the onsite training program according to both Tables 4 and 5.  
Overall, it is fair to say that these results also support the above hypothesis.  
In order to assess the impact of training on the business practices, we listed 30 
basic business practices, and during each survey, we counted how many of the 30 
practices each sample enterprise had adopted by the time of the survey.  Before 
examining the changes in these scores due to participation, we examined the association 
between the initial business practice score and the initial business performance in terms 
of the revenue, value added, and profit in 2009.  The results are shown in Table 6.  
The business score is positively associated with these indicators of business 
performance at the 1 percent level of statistical significance, even though this table is 
not intended to show the causal relationship.  This exercise is intended only to see if 
the impacts of the training programs on this business score are worth exploring below.   
Note, however, that the two rounds of follow-up survey were conducted too soon 
after the intervention for the post-training performance of the training participants to be 
reflected in their revenues, value added, or profits.  Thus, we explore only the impacts 
of the training programs on the business score, as shown in the first three columns in 
Tables 7 and 8, and the impacts on the logarithm of material costs in the last two 
columns.  Compared with sales revenues, value added, and profit, material costs may 
quickly reflect improvement in managerial skills or in business practices.  We have to 
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admit that such improvement can theoretically increase or decrease material costs. 
While better production management will reduce wasteful uses of materials, the 
improved efficiency may lead to the expansion of production, which may in turn require 
a greater input of materials in the long run.  In view of the fact that the follow-up 
surveys were conducted soon after the training programs were completed, we expect 
that our data reflect the cost reduction effect of improved management. 
     Tables 7 and 8 report the ITT impacts and TOT impacts, respectively, of the 
training programs on the business score and material cost.  The design of the first three 
columns in these tables is the same as that in Tables 4 and 5.
9
  According to column 
(iii) of Table 7, the invitation to the classroom training increased the business score by 
1.28 points (out of 30 points) for Group 2 and by 1.28 + 1.13 points for Group 1, while 
the invitation to the onsite training program increased the score by 3.84 points for 
Group 3 and by 3.84 + 0.35 points for Group 1, compared with Group 4.  The TOT 
counterparts of these impacts on the business scores are stronger for Groups 1 and 2, as 
shown in Table 8. 
     The results of the regressions of material costs are somewhat mixed.  As shown 
in column (iv) of Tables 7 and 8, the impacts of the two training programs on material 
costs are insignificant if they are estimated by means of the second follow-up survey 
only.  As shown in column (v), however, the impact of the onsite training program is 
negative and significant, if it is estimated by means of the fixed-effects estimator or the 
fixed-effects IV estimator.  The result that the impact of the onsite training was 
                                            
9
 Our panel data are no longer balanced because we failed to collect data on the 
business score and material costs from some enterprises.  For this reason, the 
relationships among coefficients mentioned in the previous section, such as 1 + 2 = 1, 
do not hold true in Table 7 and 8.  
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stronger than the impact of the classroom training is consistent with the fact that the 
onsite training was centered around KAIZEN, which emphasizes the reduction of 
wasteful uses of materials, time, and other resources. 
     Apart from the business practice score, we also elicited directly from the 
participants whether they adopted any practices that they had learnt from the training 
program.  Table 9 reports the estimated linear probability models explaining the 
presence or absence of such adoption of practices, using the sample of participants only.  
Columns (i) and (ii) concern the adoption behaviors of the classroom training 
participants.  While the willingness-to-pay is included in column (i), it is not in column 
(ii) to avoid the estimation bias problem due to the possible endogeneity of the 
willingness-to-pay.  Similarly, columns (iii) and (iv) are intended to examine the 
adoption behaviors of the onsite training participants, and their willingness-to-pay is 
included in column (iii) but not in column (iv).   
     In columns (i) and (ii), no coefficient is significant, indicating that no 
characteristics affect the adoption behavior of the participants in the classroom training 
program.  By contrast, among the onsite training participants, the adoption of any 
practices that were taught during the onsite training program is associated negatively 
with their education levels and positively with their initial willingness-to-pay, and to a 
lesser extent with their initial business scores.  Thus, the practices taught in the onsite 
training program may not be new to educated business owners, but they are worthwhile 
for less educated owners and tended to be adopted by those who had the will to learn 
about management.  This result points to the importance of raising the valuation of 
trainings by participants before intervention as it would lead to better results. 
     The results of the quantile treatment regressions are shown in the two panels of 
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Figure 2.  We find that the magnitude of the treatment effect on the business score 
generally increases with the quantile of the initial business score.  This trend holds true 
for both classroom training and onsite training.  Assuming that rank reversals in the 
business practice distribution are not common, this result suggests that those business 
owners with higher business scores generally benefit more from the training that they 
receive.  A possible interpretation is that the contents taught in our training programs 
were not too easy and required some degree of prior experience or knowledge to put 
into practice the lessons learnt.   
        
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined experimentally the impacts of managerial training 
programs undertaken in a classroom and on site.  Our first finding is that the demand 
for these training programs by the entrepreneurs prior to the offer of the trainings was 
indeed low, but it increased greatly with own experience of participation.  This lack of 
knowledge about the value of training may have been a barrier to business improvement.  
Although we did not test for other potential reasons mentioned in the introduction 
(credit constraints, supply-side constraints, positive spillovers), credit constraints were 
unlikely to be an important reason because all the entrepreneurs in our sample have 
owned assets that could be used as collateral, such as residential houses, workshop 
buildings, storehouses, sewing machines, knitting machines, motorcycles, and yarn and 
other intermediate inputs.  Rather, the concept of receiving management training in 
order to improve their business performance was new to them and, thus, they did not 
have any clear idea about where they could have received proper training, according to 
our interviews with them.  We also find that the ex-ante higher demand for training 
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enhances the positive training impacts on the performance.  This finding supports the 
importance of raising the awareness of the value of learning prior to training 
interventions. 
Secondly, we find that the managerial training did indeed improve the business 
practices and the financial performances of participating firms.  The impact on 
business practice scores was greater for the onsite training than for the classroom 
training and there was also a compounding effect from participating in both trainings.  
Thirdly, examining the distribution of the training effect, we find that both classroom 
and on-site training programs were more beneficial for those at the higher quantiles.  
These findings have immediate policy implications for the government or development 
aid agencies when they design training programs for SME managers in future. 
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Table 1: Sample Size by Group 
 
 Classroom Training 
Total 
Treatment Group Control Group 
O
n
si
te
 T
ra
in
in
g
 
Treatment 
Group 
Group 1  
32 
 
Group 3  
16 
 
Onsite treatment 
48 
(Refused: 0) 
Control 
Group 
Group 2  
57 
 
Group 4  
53 
 
Onsite control 
110 
 
Total 
Classroom treatment 
89 
(Refused: 37) 
Classroom control 
69 
 
 
158 
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Table 2: Mean Characteristics Prior to the Intervention by Treatment Status 
 Groups 1&2 Groups 3&4  Group 1 Group 2  Group 3 Group 4  
 
Invited to 
classroom 
training 
Uninvited to 
classroom 
training 
p-value 
for H0: (1) 
= (2)  
Invited to 
both 
programs 
Invited only to 
classroom 
training  
p-value 
for H0: (4) 
= (5) 
Invited only 
to onsite 
training  
Invited to 
neither 
program 
p-value 
for H0: (7) 
= (8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Owner’s age 40.9 
(8.92) 
40.8 
(10.64) 
[0.93] 40.4 
(7.91) 
41.2 
(9.50) 
[0.68] 39.3 
(8.56) 
41.4 
(11.2 
[0.49] 
Male owner (%) 36.0 
(48.26) 
37.1 
(48.67) 
[0.88] 25.0 
(43.99) 
42.1 
(49.81) 
[0.11] 43.8 
(51.23) 
34.0 
(47.81) 
[0.48] 
Owner’s education (years) 7.9 
(2.66) 
8.5 
(3.23) 
[0.18] 7.8 
(2.27) 
8.0 
(2.88) 
[0.70] 8.6 
(3.40) 
8.5 
(3.24) 
[0.89] 
Years of operation 10.2 
(4.60) 
9.5 
(4.81) 
[0.39] 10.7 
(4.80) 
9.9 
(4.51) 
[0.47] 9.8 
(4.15) 
9.5 
(5.01) 
[0.84] 
Training experience (%) 13.5 
(34.35) 
10.3 
(30.61) 
[0.55] 12.5 
(33.6) 
14.0 
(35.0) 
[0.84] 25.0 
(44.7) 
5.9 
(23.76) 
[0.03] 
Relatives abroad (#) 0.1 
(0.53) 
0.3 
(0.91) 
[0.12] 0.1 
(0.71) 
0.1 
(0.40) 
[0.54] 0.1 
(0.50) 
0.3 
(1.01) 
[0.50] 
Relatives in the sample (#) 1.3 
(1.87) 
0.8 
(1.61) 
[0.12] 2.1 
(2.03) 
0.8 
(1.63) 
[0.00] 0.5 
(0.82) 
0.92 
(1.79) 
[0.36] 
Perm workers (#) 9.2 
(10.01) 
19.0 
(39.70) 
[0.03] 8.5 
(4.92) 
9.6 
(11.99) 
[0.60] 26 
(44.14) 
17.2 
(38.82) 
[0.45] 
Seasonal workers (#) 4.1 
(6.50) 
5.8 
(9.86) 
[0.21] 5.2 
(9.02) 
3.5 
(4.51) 
[0.24] 8.1 
(13.06) 
5.2 
(8.78) 
[0.31] 
Revenue (‘09, USD) 194397 
(194996) 
283683 
(415166) 
[0.08] 239808 
(203467) 
168903 
(187067) 
[0.10] 346680 
(449209) 
267874 
(410232) 
[0.51] 
VA (‘09, USD) 59367 
(93910) 
81400 
(169585) 
[0.30] 67756 
(93626) 
54657 
(94569) 
[0.53] 90504 
(165583) 
79619 
(173773) 
[0.83] 
Willingness-to-pay for:          
  Classroom training (%) 20.2 
(40.4) 
14.3 
(35.2) 
[0.33] 28.1 
(45.7)) 
15.8 
(36.8) 
[0.17] 37.5 
(50.0) 
7.5 
(26.7) 
[0.00] 
 Onsite training (%) 5.6 
(23.2) 
8.6 
(28.2) 
[0.47] 15.6 
(36.9) 
0 
(0) 
[0.00] 25.0 
(44.7) 
3.8 
(19.2) 
[0.01] 
Note) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Classroom Training Participation (Probit, ME) 
 =1 if participated in Classroom Training 
 (i) (ii) 
Age -0.018** -0.015** 
 (2.46) (2.22) 
=1 if male 0.253* 0.217* 
 (1.92) (1.73) 
Years of education -0.030 -0.011 
 (1.12) (0.46) 
Years of operation 0.002 0.003 
 (0.14) (0.20) 
=1 if born in the village -0.223 -0.070 
 (0.66) (0.18) 
=1 if have training experience -0.089 -0.022 
 (0.49) (0.12) 
# of relatives abroad -0.134 -0.091 
 (1.17) (0.88) 
# of relatives in this sample -0.014 -0.025 
 (0.23) (0.42) 
# relatives who attended CRT 0.123 0.126 
 (1.44) (1.45) 
Total score in the baseline 0.079**  
 (2.16)  
Observations 88 89 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.15 0.11 
Notes) Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 4: ITT Impacts of Training on Willingness-to-Pay 
 WTP for Classroom Training WTP for Onsite Training 
 Cross 
section 
Panel Panel Cross 
section 
Panel Panel 
 OLS FE FE OLS FE FE 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Both Invite -0.019   0.384***   
 (0.12)   (2.72)   
Class Invite 0.259***   -0.023   
 (3.21)   (0.76)   
Onsite Invite 0.334**   0.325***   
 (2.59)   (2.87)   
Both Invite × Tclass   0.216**   0.012 
   (2.01)   (0.34) 
Both Invite × Tonsite  0.202 -0.014  0.401*** 0.389*** 
  (1.64) (0.19)  (3.22) (3.15) 
Class Invite × Tclass   0.190***   0.019 
   (3.06)   (1.00) 
Class Invite × Tonsite  0.173*** -0.018  0.036 0.018 
  (2.85) (1.00)  (1.41) (1.00) 
Onsite Invite × Tclass   -0.038   0.019 
   (1.42)   (1.00) 
Onsite Invite × Tonsite  0.025 0.062  0.144* 0.125 
  (0.37) (1.02)  (1.68) (1.49) 
Tclass   0.038   -0.019 
   (1.42)   (1.00) 
Tonsite  0.038 0.000  -0.019 -0.000 
  (1.43) (0.01)  (1.00) (0.01) 
Age -0.004   0.001   
 (1.03)   (0.27)   
=1 if male 0.054   0.025   
 (0.75)   (0.50)   
Years of education 0.001   0.014   
 (0.07)   (1.59)   
=1 if born in the village 0.225**   0.097   
 (2.10)   (1.22)   
Years of operation -0.004   -0.011**   
 (0.49)   (2.07)   
# relatives abroad -0.013   -0.059*   
 (0.22)   (1.75)   
=1 if training experience 0.012   0.094   
 (0.10)   (1.41)   
# relatives in this sample 0.031   0.008   
 (1.29)   (0.71)   
Constant 0.050 0.177*** 0.177*** -0.114 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.21) (12.34) (9.47) (0.67) (6.40) (8.06) 
Observations 156 316 474 156 316 474 
Number of ID 156 158 158 156 158 158 
R-squared 0.25 0.30 0.29 0.55 0.47 0.45 
Prob > F (or chi2) 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Notes) Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustered s.e. at ID level for ITT). * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Variables with + are instrumented with random invitation 
status. 
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Table 5: TOT Impacts of Training on Willingness-to-Pay 
 WTP for Classroom Training WTP for Onsite Training 
 Cross 
section 
Panel Panel Cross 
section 
Panel Panel 
 IV FEIV FEIV IV FEIV FEIV 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Both Participate
+
 -0.152   0.541***   
 (0.66)   (2.75)   
Class Participate
+
 0.497***   -0.025   
 (3.93)   (0.48)   
Onsite Participate 0.339***   0.340***   
 (2.70)   (3.06)   
Both Participate × Tclass
+
   0.229   0.010 
   (1.50)   (0.17) 
Both Participate × Tonsite
+
  0.217 -0.012  0.567*** 0.558*** 
  (1.41) (0.11)  (3.57) (3.44) 
Class Participate × Tclass
+
   0.362***   0.036 
   (3.58)   (1.14) 
Class Participate × Tonsite
+
  0.328*** -0.033  0.069* 0.033 
  (3.41) (0.89)  (1.66) (1.13) 
Onsite Participate × Tclass   -0.038   0.019 
   (1.54)   (1.08) 
Onsite Participate × Tonsite  0.025 0.063  0.144 0.125 
  (0.37) (0.99)  (1.55) (1.39) 
Tclass   0.038   -0.019 
   (1.54)   (1.08) 
Tonsite  0.038 0.000  -0.019 -0.000** 
  (1.54) (0.68)  (1.08) (2.37) 
Age -0.001   0.002   
 (0.38)   (0.68)   
=1 if male -0.002   -0.006   
 (0.04)   (0.12)   
Years of education 0.001   0.014*   
 (0.11)   (1.90)   
=1 if born in the village 0.245**   0.121*   
 (2.27)   (1.75)   
Years of operation -0.005   -0.009**   
 (0.77)   (2.08)   
# relatives abroad -0.010   -0.037*   
 (0.27)   (1.82)   
=1 if training experience 0.025   0.048   
 (0.25)   (0.75)   
# relatives in this sample 0.024   0.003   
 (1.11)   (0.28)   
Constant -0.058 0.177*** 0.177*** -0.181 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.28) (6.32) (6.32) (1.22) (3.64) (3.64) 
Observations 156 316 474 156 316 474 
Number of ID 156 158 158 156 158 158 
R-squared 0.46   0.64   
Prob > F(or chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes) Robust t statistics in parentheses (cluster bootstrapped s.e. at ID level for TOT). * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Variables with + are instrumented with 
random invitation status. 
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Table 6: Pre-Program Relation between the Total Scores and Performance 
 ln(Revenue) ln(VA) ln(Profit) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Total Score 0.186*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 
 (4.64) (3.18) (3.16) 
Age -0.019 -0.006 -0.007 
 (1.56) (0.46) (0.51) 
=1 if male 0.009 -0.143 -0.209 
 (0.05) (0.57) (0.82) 
Years of education -0.008 -0.015 0.007 
 (0.22) (0.30) (0.15) 
=1 if born in the village -0.093 1.326 1.007 
 (0.15) (1.51) (1.13) 
# relatives abroad 0.444*** 0.609*** 0.491*** 
 (3.27) (4.14) (3.33) 
=1 if have training experience 0.376 0.551 0.269 
 (1.42) (1.49) (0.69) 
Years of operation 0.048** 0.027 0.044 
 (2.26) (0.95) (1.60) 
# of relatives in this sample 0.124*** 0.130** 0.066 
 (2.95) (2.16) (1.03) 
Constant 9.779*** 7.258*** 7.386*** 
 (10.80) (5.59) (5.52) 
Observations 154 133 122 
R-squared 0.30 0.22 0.21 
Notes) Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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Table 7: ITT Impacts of Training on Total Scores and Log of Material Costs 
 Total Scores Log of Material Costs 
 Cross section Panel Panel Cross section Panel 
 OLS FE FE OLS FE 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Both Invite 0.429   0.056  
 (0.46)   (0.12)  
Class Invite 0.996**   0.205  
 (2.35)   (0.95)  
Onsite Invite 5.024***   0.086  
 (7.68)   (0.23)  
Both Invite × Tclass   1.137**   
   (2.50)   
Both Invite × Tonsite
ǂ
  1.472** 0.352  0.271 
  (2.50) (0.86)  (1.14) 
Class Invite × Tclass   1.287***   
   (5.24)   
Class Invite × Tonsite
ǂ
  1.309*** 0.005  -0.012 
  (4.42) (0.04)  (0.07) 
Onsite Invite × Tclass   -0.144   
   (1.32)   
Onsite Invite × Tonsite
ǂ
  3.720*** 3.847***  -0.388** 
  (17.55) (18.61)  (2.12) 
Tclass   0.144**   
   (2.30)   
Tonsite  0.280** 0.153   
  (2.45) (1.48)   
Age -0.004   -0.015  
 (0.16)   (1.41)  
=1 if male 1.244***   0.264  
 (3.01)   (1.48)  
Years of education 0.313***   0.083**  
 (3.96)   (2.44)  
=1 if born in the village 1.526*   -0.405  
 (1.94)   (1.49)  
Years of operation 0.025   0.039**  
 (0.65)   (2.04)  
# relatives abroad 0.171   0.396***  
 (0.53)   (3.83)  
=1 if training experience 1.902***   0.420  
 (3.26)   (1.46)  
# relatives in this sample -0.008   0.140***  
 (0.08)   (3.14)  
Observations 154 312 464 156 471 
R-squared 0.62 0.79 0.76 0.24 0.01 
Prob > F (or chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Notes) Although not reported, each specification has an intercept, and column (v) includes two year 
dummies.  Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustered s.e. at ID level for ITT). * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Variables with + are instrumented with random 
invitation status.  ǂ The data used in this column are a panel of 2008, 2009, and 2010. Accordingly, 
Tonsite in these interaction terms in this column should read a dummy variable,Year2010, which 
indicates whether the year is 2010. 
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Table 8: TOT Impacts of Training on Total Scores and Log of Material Costs 
 Total Scores Log of Material Costs 
 Cross section Panel Panel Cross section Panel 
 IV FEIV FEIV IV FEIV 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Both Participate
+
 0.105   -0.022  
 (0.08)   (0.03)  
Class Participate
+
 1.940***   0.396  
 (2.79)   (0.98)  
Onsite Participate 5.069***   0.094  
 (8.04)   (0.25)  
Both Participate × Tclass
+
   1.078***   
   (2.68)   
Both Participate ×Tonsite
+ ǂ
  1.601** 0.556  0.399 
  (2.04) (0.75)  (0.81) 
Class Participate × Tclass
+
   2.421***   
   (7.86)   
Class Participate × Tonsite
+ ǂ
  2.444*** -0.009  -0.023 
  (6.55) (0.04)  (0.06) 
Onsite Participate × Tclass   -0.144   
   (1.20)   
Onsite Participate×Tonsite
ǂ
  3.720*** 3.847***  -0.388** 
  (16.26) (15.47)  (2.06) 
Tclass   0.144**   
   (2.22)   
Tonsite  0.280** 0.153   
  (2.28) (1.33)   
Age 0.009   -0.013  
 (0.47)   (1.22)  
=1 if male 0.977**   0.213  
 (2.50)   (1.19)  
Years of education 0.314***   0.083**  
 (4.50)   (2.46)  
=1 if born in the village 1.638*   -0.384  
 (1.89)   (1.39)  
Years of operation 0.023   0.039*  
 (0.67)   (1.95)  
# relatives abroad 0.208   0.401***  
 (0.81)   (4.36)  
=1 if training experience 1.891***   0.421  
 (3.38)   (1.46)  
# relatives in this sample -0.039   0.134***  
 (0.43)   (2.72)  
Observations 154 312 464 471 156 
Number of ID 154 158 158 158 156 
R-squared 0.71    0.22 
Prob > F (or chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
Notes) Although not reported, each specification has an intercept, and column (v) includes two year 
dummies. Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustered s.e. at ID level for ITT, cluster bootstrapped s.e. 
at ID level for TOT). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Variables 
with + are instrumented with random invitation status. ǂ The data used in column (v) are a panel of 
2008, 2009, and 2010. Accordingly, Tonsite in these interaction terms in this column should read a 
dummy variable,Year2010, which indicates whether the year is 2010.
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Table 9: Estimated Linear Probability Model of Application of Learning after Training  
 =1 if implemented something learnt after 
participating in: 
 Classroom Training Onsite Training 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Age -0.004 -0.003 -0.013 -0.013 
 (1.07) (1.03) (1.41) (1.37) 
=1 if male 0.054 0.057 -0.056 -0.065 
 (0.80) (0.85) (0.32) (0.38) 
Education -0.029 -0.030 -0.067** -0.065* 
 (1.56) (1.58) (2.05) (1.87) 
Years of operation -0.005 -0.004 -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.35) (0.34) (0.96) (1.10) 
=1 if have training experience -0.052 -0.051 0.089 0.059 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.23) 
# relatives abroad -0.033 -0.043 0.075 0.068 
 (1.09) (1.29) (1.65) (1.54) 
Total score before classroom training 0.020 0.024   
 (1.36) (1.57)   
Willingness-to-pay for classroom training before 
classroom training 
0.061    
 (1.24)    
Total score before onsite training    0.024 0.033* 
   (1.30) (1.78) 
Willingness-to-pay for onsite training before 
onsite training 
  0.194**  
   (2.14)  
Constant 1.124*** 1.087*** 1.743** 1.698** 
 (3.93) (4.09) (2.28) (2.12) 
Observations 52 52 46 46 
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.20 0.16 
Dependent variable mean 94.2% 85.4% 
  standard deviation 0.24 0.36 
Note) Robust t statistics in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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Figure 1: Schedule for the Training Programs and the Surveys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The reason for attrition in the 2nd follow-up survey is the closure of one firm. 
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Figure 2: Quantile Treatment Effects on Business Practice Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The solid lines are the quantile treatment effects and the dashed lines are the 95% 
confidence interval. Bootstrapped standard errors are used. Each QTE is statistically 
significant at the 1% level for Q2-8 in panel a) and all quantiles in panel b) and at the 
5% level for Q1 in panel a).  Out of the 36 possible combinations of any quantiles, we 
reject the equality of QTE for 4 combinations in panel a) and 18 combinations in panel 
b). 
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